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Abstract 
There is considerable evidence that males are more prone to take risks than females. This difference 
has implications for rates of promotion in hierarchies where promotion is based on random signals of 
ability.  I explore the promotion consequences of three types of performance standards: gender-blind 
standards, standards designed to promote agents of equal ability on average, and standards designed 
to promote equal numbers of both genders. These three objectives lead to different promotion 
standards, which highlights among other things that the goal of affirmative action is not well 
defined.  Lower promotion standards for females can be necessary to ensure either equal abilities or 
equal numbers in the promoted populations. 
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A±rmative action remains a contentious subject in the regulation of labor mar-
kets. Policies that give preferential treatment to women or minorities can be
seen as addressing inequities by creating other inequities. For the most part,
economists have tried to evaluate a±rmative action policies by their e®ects on
e±ciency rather than equity, especially productive e±ciency. See for example,
Holzer and Neumark (2000), who argue from an extensive empirical literature
that \a±rmative action o®ers signi¯cant redistribution toward women and mi-
norities, with relatively small e±ciency consequences" (page 559).
At the theoretical level, authors have argued that a±rmative action policies
can enhance e±ciency rather that undermine it. Lundberg and Startz (1983)
and Lundberg (1991) consider a model of statistical discrimination where wages
depend on imperfect signals of ability, and show, among other things, that if
workers with di®erentsignalling ability are pooled, thereis more incentive to invest
in human capital. Milgrom and Oster (1987) argue that a±rmative action policies
can e±ciently prevent employers from underpromoting women and minorities.
The incentive to underpromote derives from a fear of revealing the worth of their
employees to rival ¯rms, a threat which is higher for the more \invisible" workers,
such as women and minorities.
In this paper I take a di®erent view of both labor markets and a±rmative
action. I consider labor market hierarchies, in which promotion to stage t requires
prior promotion to stage t¡1: I take investments in human capital as exogenous,
and assume that wages at each stage of the hierarchy are immutable. My focus
is entirely on rates of promotion, and how they are a®ected by discrimination of
various types. Examples of such hierarchies might be² law, where law students are promoted to associates in law ¯rms, associates
are promoted to partner, and some partners eventually become judges;
² corporate life, where there is a well-de¯ned executive hierarchy;
² and academic life where undergraduates are promoted to graduate student,
graduate students are promoted to assistant professor, and assistant profes-
sors are promoted to full professor.
The behavioral premise of the model presented here, which leads to di®erent
promotion rates in hierarchies, is that males are more inclined to take risks than
females. There is considerable evidence that this is so. An excellent summary can
be found in Eckel and Grossman (forthcoming 2003), who report on experiments
that demonstrate, for example, that males and females have di®erent gambling be-
havior. The evidence is also strong from \¯eld studies" (natural experiments such
as observing behavior in placing bets), but less conclusive in \contextual environ-
mental" experiments such as experiments involving insurance choices. One of the
most interesting risk-taking contexts is investment. In a study that used measures
of risk tolerance reported in the Wall Street Journal, and measures of personality
traits developed by psychologists, Stanford and Vallenga (2002) found that males
have much higher risk tolerance than females. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998)
came to the same conclusion by observing investment portfolios. Much of the ex-
perimental evidence comes from disciplines other than economics. For example,
psychologists Ginsburg et al (2002) observed children at a zoo in contexts where
the children could choose to engage in a risky activity or not. They concluded
strongly that young boys were much more inclined to put themselves at risk than
young girls.
2I do not wish to leave the impression that this list is exhaustive or even rep-
resentative, but only to argue that it is much easier to ¯nd papers that support
a gender di®erence in risk-taking than to ¯nd papers that reject it. Many schol-
ars have suggested evolutionary arguments for why it might be so. Dekel and
Scotchmer (1999) postulated that males play \winner-take-all" games, and ex-
plored a precise sense in which such games do (or do not) lead to riskier behavior.
The premise in that paper, which is also adopted here, is that such behavior is
genetically coded. The premise that risk-taking is genetic, rather than a rational
response to incentives, or a product of \nurture" rather than \nature," seems
consistent with other genetic evidence, such as the fact that males have higher
variance than females on dimensions such as longevity, size, and vulnerability to
disease.
In this paper, I do not try to explain why males are more risk-taking than
females, but simply explore the consequences for promotion in hierarchies. Agents
are promoted based on signals of ability that can be noisy. The random process
is determined by their genetic coding. This is obviously an extreme and stylized
assumption, but one worth exploring if there is any element of truth to it.
I explore the promotion consequences of three alternative types of performance
standards: equal promotion standards for both genders, standards designed to
promote agents of equal average ability, and standards designed to promote equal
numbers of both genders. The intuition for the consequences of these policies are
explained graphically in the next section, at least with respect to the ¯rst stage of
the hierarchy. Perhaps the most important implication of this discussion is that,
in such a model, \a±rmative action" has no clearly de¯ned meaning. It cannot
be de¯ned without an objective in mind, and the following objectives are pairwise
inconsistent:
3² equal promotion standards
² equal numbers of promotions
² promotion of a pool of agents with equal average ability.
The next section gives a graphical discussion of how the di®erence in risk-
taking matters for promotion. This is followed in Section 3 by a more formal
discussion that extends to an ini¯nite hierarchy. Section 4 explores alternative
interpretations of riak-taking in hierarchies, and in Section 5, I point out some
implications for e±ciency.
2. A Graphical Discussion
Figure 1 shows the distribution of true ability a, denoted G with density g,i ne a c h
of two populations, a risk-taking population (males) and a risk-averse population
(females). The density ~ g represents the distribution of signals that the risk-taking
population will generate, when their true ability a is confounded by noise. The
signal of a random male will be ¾ = a + u,w h e r ea is his true ability, and u is
distributed according to a cumulative distribution function Á with mean zero.
Consider the ¯rst round of a promotion hierarchy. Suppose that the promotion
standard for males is c: That is, every male who generates a signal above c
is promoted. The other promotion standards are for females: The promotion
standard fe will ensure that females are promoted with the same probability as
males, and the promotion standard fa will ensure that the expected ability of
promoted females is the same as that of promoted males: If the promotion policy
is gender blind, then females are also promoted according to the standard c:
4a, σ= a+u 
    f 
a      f 




The ¯rst thing to notice is the consequence of a gender-blind policy. If males
and females are treated equally in the sense of being promoted according to the
same standard c; then (provided that fewer than half are promoted)
² more males than females are promoted; and
² the females have higher ability on average.
The latter is for two reasons: more men than women are promoted, and some
of them are mistakes.
The gender-blind policy is clearly inhospitable to females at the ¯rst stage,
however reasonable it may seem from a procedural point of view. Consider instead
an \a±rmative action" policy to promote equal numbers of males and females.
Then the promotion standard for females must clearly be lower than for males, in
particular, fe: Even so,
² under an a±rmative action program to promote equal numbers of males and
5females, promoted females will on average have higher ability than promoted
males.
Is this \fair?" An a±rmative action policy aimed at equal numbers is still
inhospitable to females in the sense that, on average, promoted females have
higher ability than promoted males. Their superior ability is due to the fact that,
in promoting males, mistakes are made in both directions. Low-ability males are
promoted, and high-ability males are excluded. Females could reasonably argue
that the system should impose an even lower bar for females, in order to remedy
the discrepancy in average (and marginal) ability.
Consider then an a±rmative action policy aimed at ensuring equal ability of
both promoted groups, instead of equal numbers.T h e n
² under an a±rmative action goal of promoting females with the same ex-
pected ability as males, fewer males than females will be promoted; and
² the standard for female promotion should be lower than for males, and even
lower than the one than ensures equal numbers.
The much lower promotion standard for females is a bit paradoxical: it ap-
pears to favor females of lower ability than males, but in fact the females have
higher ability on average. A higher standard must be applied to males in order
to compensate for the mistakes.
The graphical discussion only illuminates the ¯rst stage of promotion. At
the second stage, the pools of surviving males and females are di®erent. High-
ability males have been eliminated due to randomness, and low-ability males
remain. How many agents get promoted at the second stage depends again
on the objective. Consider, for example, the gender-blind policy of a common
6standard. At stage two, the males may still have an advantage due to the new
draw of noise that will boost some of them above the bar. However, at stage two,
there is a countervailing e®ect. The boost due to noise must be strong enough
to overcome the higher ability of the remaining females. At some point in the
hierarchy, ability will dominate noise, and males will no longer be promoted in
higher numbers. Fewer and fewer males are promoted, but in yet another switch-
around, at much later stages of the hierarchy, the only males that remain are those
with very high ability who survived their many opportunities to be eliminated.
These issues are considered formally below.
3. The Hierarchy
Let G be a distribution from which each agent's ability, denoted a 2 R; is drawn
independently. Index the agents by i =1 ;:::: An agent i generates a signal of
ability ¾i
t 2 R in period t.I ft h ea g e n ti is female, we assume that ¾i
t = ai (the
signal is nonrandom). If the agent i is a male, ¾i
t = ai+ui
t, where the random noise
ui
t is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function Á with mean zero
and positive variance, and the random draws of noise in di®erent stages of the
hierarchy are independent. The designations \male" and \female" refer to the
riskiness of the signals that are produced. This analysis would obviously apply
to any two groups that di®er in the randomness of their signals. In that sense,
the designations male and female are only illustrative, and can even be reversed
(see below).
Promotion standards are sequences fmtgt=1:::,fftgt=1:::: Am a l ea g e n ti survives
to stage t if ¾i
d ¸ md for each d · t, and a female agent i survives to stage t if
ai ¸ fd for each d · t: We say that the promotion standards are gender-blind if
there is a sequence fctg such that mt = ft = ct for each t:
7For females, we can assume without loss of generality that the promotion
standards are nondecreasing. If at any point a higher cuto® is followed by a lower
cuto®, that is, ft+1 <f t; then ft+1 can be replaced by ft with no consequence. All
the agents with ability between ft+1 and ft have in any case been eliminated at
stage t. We will thus assume that fftg is nondecreasing. Then a female survives
to stage t if a ¸ ft and does not survive otherwise: Hence the probability that a




A male with ability a survives to stage t if a + ud >m d for all d · t: Hence the





d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ a))da (3.2)


















d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ a))
R 1
¡1g(a)¦t
d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ a))da
da (3.4)
We use the following assumptions, which are assumed throughout.
1. The distribution G is symmetric,1 strictly increasing, has a density g that
is strictly quasiconcave and continuous, and has the real line as support.
2. The distribution Á is symmetric and strictly increasing with zero mean and
support the real line.
1For all x in the support, G(x)=1¡G(¡x):
8We begin with two lemmas. The intuition for the ¯rst lemma is that the
promoted males include mistakes in both directions. Lower-ability males are
promoted by mistake, and higher-ability males are excluded by mistake. Since
no mistakes are made in promoting females, the only way to ensure that promoted
males have as high ability as females is to promote fewer of them. At the ¯rst
stage, promoting fewer of them will require that females have a lower promotion
standard. At later stages, after males have been eliminated in previous promotion
stages, a lower promotion standard for males can still be consistent with fewer
promotions or higher ability.
Lemma 3.1. Let fmtg,fftg be the promotion standards. The expected ability of
a random surviving male is lower than the expected ability of a random surviving
female at any stage t at which males have at least as high a probability of survival.
Proof: With a change of variables, y = a ¡ ft; the females' expected ability




g(ft + y) R 1
0 g(ft + y)dy




g (ft + y) R 1
0 g (ft + y)dy
dy (3.5)
For males, with a change of variables y = a¡ft; the expected ability conditional





d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ ft ¡ y)) R 1
¡1 g(ft + y)¦t







d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ ft ¡ y)) R 1
¡1 g(ft + y)¦t
d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ ft ¡ y))dy
dy (3.6)
It holds that (3.5) is greater than (3.6) if the following inequality holds for
y ¸ 0:
g(ft + y)¦t
d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ ft ¡ y)) R 1
¡1g(ft + y)¦t
d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ ft ¡ y))dy
<
g (ft + y) R 1
0 g (ft + y)dy
9Since g(ft+y)¦t
d=1(1¡Á(md¡ft¡y)) · g(ft + y); (3.5) is greater than (3.6)
if the denominator of the lefthand side is no smaller than the denominator of the
righthand side. The denominators are the probabilities that a male or female
survives, respectively. ¤
In the next lemma, the ¯rst part re°ects the fact that, regardless of the pro-
motion standards, each male has positive probability of being eliminated at each
stage. Since excluded agents cannot re-enter the pool, only few males will survive
in the long run.
The second part re°ects the fact that, regardless of the promotion standards,
only the males with very high ability will survive many opportunities to be elim-
inated. Thus, in the \long run", it does not matter very much what the pro-
motion standards are, as long as there is a possibility to be eliminated at each
stage. Males that survive will likely have very high ability. In contrast, a female
will survive with probability one if her ability is above the maximum promotion
standard. This means that more females survive in the long run, even without
extraordinary ability.
Lemma 3.2. Let fmtg,fftg be promotion standards that are bounded above and
below. Then
(1) Given ">0, there exists ~ t such that for t>~ t, the probability that a male
survives to stage t is less than ";a n d
(2) There exists ^ t such that for t>^ t; the expected ability of a surviving male is
larger than the expected ability of a surviving female.
Proof: Let m =i n f fmtg,¹ m =s u p fmtg;f =i n f fftg, ¹ f =s u p fftg:
(1) Let ">0: Let ~ a>0s a t i s f y0< 1 ¡ G(~ a) <" = 2a n dl e t~ t satisfy
10Á(a ¡ m)
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Á(~ a¡ ¹ m)
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For t>^ t; female ability (3.3) is less than male ability (3.4). ¤
I use these lemmas to characterize the consequences of gender-blind promotion
standards.
Proposition 3.3. (Gender Blind Promotions) Suppose that the promotion stan-
dards are gender blind and that c1 >E G(a);G (ct) < 1 for all t: Then
(1) At the ¯rst stage, if c1 >E G(a); a random male has a higher probability of
12survival than a random female, and a random surviving female will have higher
expected ability than a random surviving male.
(2) At later stages, t>~ t for some appropriate ~ t; the probability that a random
male survives is smaller than the probability a random female survives, but the
expected ability of surviving males is larger than the expected ability of surviving
females.
Proof: (1) At stage 1, the probability (3.2) that a male survives can be
written as follows with a change of variables x = a ¡ c1; and using symmetry of
Á : Z 1
¡1














g(c1 ¡ x)Á(¡x)dx +
Z 1
0




[g(c1 ¡ x) ¡ g(c1 + x)Á(¡x)dx +
Z 1
0





The inequality holds because
R 1
0 [g(c1 ¡x)¡g(c1 +x)Á(¡x)dx > 0 due to the
strict quasiconcavity and symmetry of g and c1 >E g(a): Hence (3.2) is larger
than (3.1) at t =1 : Using Lemma 3.1, the expected ability of a surviving male
is lower than the expected ability of a surviving female.
(2) follows directly from Lemma 3.2 by choosing ">0 such that (1¡G(f)) >" :
¤
We now turn to alternative policy goals. We ¯rst consider the goal of equal-
izing the probabilities of promotion at each stage, and then consider the goal of
equalizing the average ability of the survivors at each stage.
13It follows directly from Lemma 3.2(1) that bounded sequences fmtg,fftg can-
not have the property that males and females have the same probability of pro-
motion at all stages. Part (2) of the following proposition points out that it is
impossible to equalize promotion rates with a nondecreasing sequence of promo-
tion standards for males, and in fact, the sequence cannot be bounded below. A
nondecreasing sequence of promotion standards would be the natural interpreta-
tion of a promotion hierarchy. In order to promote equal numbers of males and
females, females must be favored at early stages of the hierarchy, and males must
be favored at later stages of the hierarchy, in terms of the promotion standard.
Proposition 3.4. (Promoting Equal Numbers) Let fmtg,fftg be promotion stan-
dards such that males and females have the same probability of promotion at each
stage t:
(1) If f1;m 1 >E G(a),t h e nf1 <m 1 (the promotion standard for females is lower
than for males at stage 1).
(2) If the sequence fftg converges to a ¯nite limit, then the sequence fmtg is not
bounded below.
Proof: (1) follows from Proposition 3.3(1), which implies that if m1 = f1;
males have a higher probability of survival than females. Since the probability
of survival is decreasing in m1; the probabilities can only be equal if m1 >f 1:
(2) Since fftg c o n v e r g e s ,t h es e q u e n c eo ff e m a l es u r v i v a lr a t e sf1¡G(ft)gt=1;:::




a))dagt=1;::: converges to the same limit, say L.C h o o s e a n ">0s u c ht h a t"<L :
Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that fmtg is bounded below by m: The
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Choose ~ a; ^ a such that ^ a<~ a and
1 ¡ G(~ a) <" = 3
G(^ a) <" = 3
Choose ^ t such that (1¡Á(m¡~ a))
^ t <" = 3: Then if t>^ t; the upper bound on the
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t + "=3 <"<L
¤
Proposition 3.5. (Promoting Equal Average Ability) (1) Suppose that the ex-
pected abilities of surviving males and females are the same at stage t under the
promotion standards fmtg,fftg : T h e nt h es u r v i v a lr a t eo ff e m a l e sa ts t a g et
must be greater than that of males. (2) There are no bounded sequences of
promotion standards fmtg,fftg for which promoted males have the same average
ability as promoted females at each t.
Proof: The probability densities of females' and males abilities, conditional





d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ a))
R 1
¡1g(a)¦t
d=1(1 ¡ Á(md ¡ a))da
(3.10)
(1) Suppose to the contrary that (3.2) is at least as great as (3.1). Thus
the denominator of (3.10) is at least as great as the denominator of (3.9). Since
¦t
d=1(1¡Á(md¡a)) < 1a te a c ht; it follows that the density (3.10) is smaller than
t h ef e m a l ed e n s i t y( 3 . 9 )a te a c ha 2 (ft;1): The remaining density for males is
on abilities lower than the minimum ability for females, ft: Hence the expected
ability for females is higher than that for males, a contradiction.
(2) Lemma 3.2(2) shows that, for any bounded sequences, the average ability
of surviving males is higher than the average ability of surviving females for late
stages of the hierarchy (large t). ¤
4. Interpretations
Some of these conclusions can be noticed empirically and others cannot. At most
we can observe promotion rules, signals, and proportions promoted, but we cannot
in general observe true abilities.
Of course there is the additional problem of identifying hierarchies that have
adhered to a particular promotion policy despite the legal and political challenges
of the past several decades. It is also hard to identify hierarchies where the
same proportions of women and men have wanted to stay in the pool. Instead,
women and men drop out at di®erent rates for self-motivated reasons such as
child bearing. Nevertheless, I point out two conclusions that would be empirically
consistent with this model if data were available:
1. Under a gender-blind promotion policy, the ratio of surviving females to
surviving males at early stages of the hierarchy should be smaller than in
the original population, but should be larger at later stages of the hierarchy.
16The proportion of females that survive in the limit should exceed their
proportion in the original population.
2. Under an equal-abilities promotion policy, the ratio of surviving females to
surviving males should be increasing with time, and should be greater at
every t than in the original population.
The hypotheses that males generate riskier signals than females, and that the
two groups start from identical distributions of ability, can both be challenged. It
is thus worth commenting on how this model changes under alternative hypothe-
ses.
First, instead of assuming that males and females have the same distribution
of abilities, assume that males have the same mean ability as females, but greater
variance. This is also a \riskiness" hypothesis, but one that characterizes the
populations rather than behavior. The model can be thought of as one in which
males get a single draw of random noise, which persists throughout their working
lives. Or, instead of being independent, the draws of random noise in successive
periods are perfectly correlated.
With independent draws of random noise, a promoted male is always in jeop-
ardy of being excluded by a subsequent draw, and that is why the survival rate of
males is smaller than that of females in the long run. With perfectly correlated
noise, the promoted male has no such fear. Like females, he can only drop out
at a subsequent stage if the promotion standard is raised. As a consequence, the
initial advantage described by Proposition 3.3(1) for gender-blind standards will
persist, and there will always be disproportionately many males in the pool, with
lower average ability than females.
This discrepancy could be remedied with a sequence of standards fftg;fmtg
17that favor females, ft <m t for all t: If the higher signal generated by males is
interpreted as persistent noise, then such a program of a±rmative action would
have the dual bene¯ts of increasing the promotion of women and increasing the
average ability of people who are promoted. However if the higher signal gener-
ated by males is due to the fact that males have higher variance in ability, and
signals accurately re°ect ability, then the policy of a±rmative action would reduce
the average ability of people who are promoted.
The second alternative interpretation reverses the hypothesis about which
group generates risky signals. Again assume that the distributions of abilities
are the same, but instead of assuming that males generate risky signals, assume
that females generate risky signals. An explanation for this reversal might lie in
a variant on the Milgrom and Oster (1987) \invisibility" hypothesis: Neither the
ability of males nor of females is observable, but males generate more evidence
about their true ability than females. Thus when an observer views the signal
at any stage of the hierarchy, interpreted as some type of mean performance, he
believes that he is observing a random variable which is an unbiased estimator
of the mean, but has higher variance for females than males. For reasons that
we will leave aside here, males may generate more evidence in each hierarchical
stage than females. Their abilities may be fully observable, whereas the abilities
of females are observable with noise.
If the hypothesis on riskiness of signals is reversed, then the interpretation of
the above propositions is reversed. Instead of being disfavored at the early stages
of the gender-blind hierarchy and favored in later stages, females are favored in
early stages and disfavored in later stages. In fact, Proposition 3.3(2) can then
be interpreted as the formalization of a 1970's slogan: Women have to be \twice
as good to get half as far."
185. E±ciency
The analysis above has been positive and not normative. I have described the
paths of promotions that would follow from various promotion standards. Of
course the motive behind a±rmative action is a normative one, namely, to redress
the apparent inequity of promoting more males than females. We now turn to
whether there is an \e±ciency/equity" tradeo®.
E±ciency is hard to de¯ne in a partial model of a labor market such as this.
In fact, since a±rmative action has many faces, its e±ciency e®ects are hard to
identify in general, as discussed by Holzer and Neumark (2000). I will think of
e±ciency as being served by the promotion of the most able agents.
If the males' signals were so random that the truth was mostly obscured,
it would probably be better to promote only females, for whom the ability is
more observable. This wisdom is particularly compelling if the number of agents
required at the next level of promotion is small relative to the pool, so that
ability is not compromised by promoting enough females to ¯ll the slots. The
main prescription in this regard is given by Proposition 3.5, which points out
that, if equal abilities are desired in the promoted pool, more females than males
must survive at every stage. At early stages of the hierarchy, this should be
accomplished by giving females an a±rmative-action boost (Proposition 3.3(1)),
and at later stages of the hierarchy, equal abilities require that males get an
a±rmative-action boost (Proposition 3.3(2)).
When the initial winnowing process promotes less than half the pool { captured
in the hypothesis that the promotion standard is on the downward sloping part
of the density function { females will initially be disadvantaged under a gender-
blind policy. However their disadvantage will be overcome at later stages. The
19disadvantage is self-rectifying. However, both the early-stage inequities and late-
stage inequities are ine±cient. A better policy would be to increase the promotion
of females at the early stages, e..g, by giving them a lower promotion standard
(\a±rmative action"), and to increase the promotion of males at later stages, also
by tinkering with the promotion standard. This remedy will not be implemented
by promoting equal numbers. With equal numbers, according to Lemma 3.1,
promoted males are less able than promoted females at all stages.
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